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DEFINING GOOD FAITH LETTJER OF CREDIT
PRACTICES
James G. Barnes*
I. INTRODUCTION
Letter of credit specialists cringe when reading an opinion that
sets out to apply contract law to a letter of credit, because that ap-
proach misconceives the nature of the undertaking and frequently
leads to the wrong result.' Nonspecialist transactional lawyers, liti-
gators, and judges frequently apply contract law principles and meth-
odology rather than the principles and specific practices peculiar to
letters of credit, in part because codification of letter of credit law in
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is limited in scope.2 Believing
that nonspecialists would be helped if UCC Article 5 were more ex-
pansive in its articulation of the peculiarities of letter of credit under-
takings, letter of credit specialists have favored the UCC Article 5
revision.
3
The American Bar Association/U.S. Council on International
Banking, Inc. (ABA/USCIB) Task Force Report that launched the
pending effort of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
* Mr. Barnes is a partner of Baker & McKenzie in Chicago, Illinois. He chairs the
Letter of Credit Subcommittee of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Business Law Section. He is also an advisor to the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Drafting Committee to revise Uniform
Commercial Code Article 5 and a delegate to the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law Working Group on Standby Letters of Credit and Independent
Guarantees.
1. This is common ground among those (James E. Byrne, Albert J. Givray, and me)
with primary responsibility in recent years for the letter of credit segment of The Business
Lawyer's annual Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) survey. See, e.g., Albert J. Givray et
al., Letters of Credit, 47 Bus. LAw. 1571, 1574-75 (1992). See generally JOHN F. DOLAN,
THE LAw OF LETTERs OF CREDrr 2.01 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1994) (distinguishing letters
of credit from other contracts); TASK FoRcE ON THE STUDY OF U.C.C. ARTICLE 5, AN
EXAMINATION OF U.C.C. ARTICLE 5 (LETrERS OF CREDrr) 8 (1989), reprinted in 45 Bus.
LAW. 1521, 1561-63 (1990) [hereinafter ABA/USCIB TASK FORCE REPORT] (Task Force
was comprised of members of both American Bar Association's Business Law Section and
U.S. Council on International Banking, Inc.) (stating law should reflect unique characteris-
tics of letters of credit).
2. See official comments to U.C.C. §§ 5-101, -102(3) (1990).
3. Revision of UCC Article 5 was not favored by all. See, e.g., Henry Harfield, In
Defense of Present Letter of Credit Law: A Plea in Confession and Avoidance, 9 GEO.
MASON U. L. Rnv. 211 (1987).
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form State Laws (NCCUSL) to revise UCC Article 5 was developed
by letter of credit specialists: two law professors, five practicing law-
yers, and three bankers.4 The lawyer members of the ABA/USCIB
Task Force viewed letters of credit as unique undertakings and letter
of credit law as law merchant. We viewed the UCC as an appropriate
home for letters of credit, because the UCC codifies the law of other
mercantile specialties and is generally oriented toward commercial
rather than consumer concerns-and letters of credit clearly do not
raise consumer concerns.5 Given that law merchant is derived not
from courts or ivory towers but from commercial practice, we greatly
valued the bankers' explanations of practice, as well as their perspec-
tives as large scale processors of letter of credit applications and draw-
ings. We viewed recognition of, and alignment with, the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP)-which has
the effect of assuring compatibility with non-U.S. letter of credit law-
as critical to the success of UCC Article 5 revision. Developing an
international, practice-based framework for analyzing questions, as
well as looking to standard practice for specific answers, is basic to the
ABA/USCIB Task Force Report.6
4. The Task Force on the Study of UCC Article 5 report was presented to the Letter
of Credit Subcommittee of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the American
Bar Association's Business Law Section and to the U.S. Council on International Banking,
Inc. by American Bar Association members: Professor James E. Byrne (George Mason
University School of Law), Chair, Professor Boris Kozolchyk (University of Arizona Col-
lege of Law), Michael Evan Avidon (Moses & Singer), James G. Barnes (Baker & McKen-
zie), Arthur G. Lloyd (Citibank, N.A.), Janis S. Penton (Rosen, Wachtell & Gilbert), and
Richard F. Purcell (Connell Rice & Sugar Co., Inc.); and by U.S. Council on International
Banking, Inc. members: Alan Bloodgood (Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.), Charles del Busto
(Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.), and Vincent Maulella (Manufacturers Hanover 'Rust
Co.). See cover page to ABA/USCIB TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1 (cover page to
report not reproduced in volume 45 of The Business Lawyer).
5. UCC Article 5 competes with non-UCC law in New York and three other states by
virtue of an opt-out provision enacted in those states for letters of credit made subject to
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP). See ALA. CODn § 7-
5-102(4) (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-5102(D) (1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-
102(4) (Vernon 1994); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 5-102(4) (McKinney Supp. 1994). It also com-
petes with non-U.S. law in the case of letters of credit issued outside the United States and
in due course will compete with a convention on independent guarantees and standby let-
ters of credit being drafted under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL). See James E. Byrne, Domestic and International
Harmonization of Letter of Credit Law: UCP, UCCArticle 5 and the UNCITRAL Conven-
tion-An Evaluation at Midstream, in COMMERCIAL LAW ANNUAL 325 (Louis F. Del Duca
& Patrick Del Duca eds., 1993). However, the UCC does not compete with federal legisla-
tion or regulation. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1994) (stating that national banks may issue
letters of credit subject to UCC or UCP).
6. For example, the ABA/USCIB Task Force suggested that a three-day examination
period was too short, particularly if all defenses could be precluded for failure to act within
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Revision of UCC Article 5, as undertaken by the NCCUSL
Drafting Committee that first met in January 1991, is now approach-
ing completion. Draft Revised UCC Article 57 is generally viewed by
letter of credit specialists as significantly expanding and improving
current UCC Article 5. We appreciate its recognition that observance
of "standard practice" provides an important norm for letter of credit
issuers dealing with named beneficiaries and also successor benefi-
ciaries claiming a right of substitution by operation of law." We worry,
however, that general UCC principles, notably the UCC section 1-203
principle that every contract or duty within the UCC imposes an obli-
gation of good faith in its performance or enforcement, will be applied
to letter of credit undertakings as if they were contracts. We oppose
adding "and observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing" to the current "honesty in fact ' definition of "good faith." 9
Accordingly, we were active in the debate over the appropriate defini-
that time period. This suggestion was influenced by the fact that the UCP would not likely
embrace a three-day examination period, nor would the New York banks engage in
processing of large numbers of draws under commercial letters of credit because their
practices were UCP-oriented, and the typical turnaround time was five days, not three. See
ABA/USCIB TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 27, reprinted in 45 Bus. LAW. at 1599-
1603.
7. A copy of the August 1994 draft revision of UCC Article 5, in the form recom-
mended at the 1994 NCCUSL Annual Meeting, is on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review. The draft revised statutory language resulted from the NCCUSL Drafting
Committee meeting in New York on March 11-13, 1994, and abbreviated meeting in Chi-
cago on July 30-31, 1994, with a few changes made during the reading on August 1,1994, at
the NCCUSL annual meeting in Chicago. This copy of the draft revision of UCC Article 5
will be referred to in this Essay as "Draft Revised" UCC Article 5. The 1990 version of the
UCC will be referred to as "current UCC."
8. See Draft Revised U.C.C. §§ 5-108(e), -112(b)(2), -113(b) (containing references to
"standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of credit").
9. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990) (" 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."). By "we," I mean lawyers who think of themselves as letter of
credit specialists as distinguished from UCC specialists. There are surely exceptions, but
on the topic of keeping the "honesty in fact" definition of "good faith" for purposes of
letter of credit law, the letter of credit specialists are in substantial agreement. See, e.g.,
Attachments to Memorandum from Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair, to the NCCUSL Drafting
Committee (Jan. 12, 1994) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). This
memorandum contained supplemental materials for the 1994 San Francisco meeting, in-
cluding: Memorandum from James G. Barnes to James J. White (Jan. 8, 1994) (comments
of USCIB) (favoring narrow definition); Letter from James G. Barnes to Donald J. Rapson
(Dec. 29, 1993) (favoring narrow definition); Letter from John F. Dolan to James J. White
3 (Jan. 4, 1994) (favoring narrow definition); Letter from Donald J. Rapson to James G.
Barnes 3 (Jan. 5, 1994) (favoring expanded definition); Summary of January 7, 1994, Meet-
ing of New York State Bar Association Subcommittee on Letters of Credit 1 (attached to
Letter from Michael E. Avidon to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. and James J. White (Jan. 11, 1994))
(favoring narrow definition); Memorandum from Paul S. Turner to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. and
James J. White 3-6 (Jan. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Turner Memorandum] (favoring expanded
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tion of good faith for UCC Article 5 purposes, and we applaud the
decision of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee to keep the current
honesty in fact definition for revised UCC Article 5.10
The debate over the definition of good faith applicable to letters
of credit is part of a larger debate about whether a single UCC defini-
tion of good faith is desirable and, more generally, whether a revised
UCC should strive to set forth a single set of core principles. This
Essay proceeds on the basis that, at least as applied to letters of credit,
the UCC should stay focused on identifying the practices that are ac-
cepted in the marketplace, on facilitating those practices, and not on
developing abstract legal principles for general application to con-
tracts and mercantile specialties. Accordingly, this Essay focuses on
the particular letter of credit practices to which an obligation to exer-
cise good faith might be applied, including: (1) beneficiary demands
for payment against documents that the beneficiary knows or should
know are noncomplying or untruthful; (2) issuer honor of documents
that the issuer knows or should know are fraudulent-or presented in
bad faith; (3) issuer dishonor of a beneficiary's demand for which the
issuer clearly has no defense;41 (4) applicant refusal to reimburse
when the applicant clearly has no defense; and (5) applicant assertion
of groundless claims of beneficiary fraud-or bad faith-for the pur-
pose of delaying honor by the issuer. In these critical contexts, expan-
sion of the definition of good faith would confuse and conflict with
existing domestic and foreign letter of credit law and practice based
on strict compliance, strict preclusion, strict performance of the is-
suer's undertaking to pay, the limited fraud exception to the indepen-
definition). I have been engaged to represent the USCIB in connection with UCC Article
5 revision since September 1993 and was so acting when I wrote to Donald J. Rapson.
10. This debate was summarized by the chair of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee as
follows:
Summarized below are policy issues that the Drafting Committee has re-
solved in a manner acceptable on balance to issuers, beneficiaries and applicant
representatives but on which there was a minority that hold strong contrary
opinions:
"Good Faith" definition. This draft uses the Article 1 definition of "honesty
in fact" (Subjective Stindard). Issuers (particularly Banks) believe that ad-
ding "fair dealing" will undermine certainty of payment by inviting courts to
look into the underlying transaction, thereby seriously eroding the "indepen-
dence" principle and the "strict compliance" standard essential to the com-
mercial effectiveness of Letters of Credit. The Drafting Committee supports
this view.
Memorandum from Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair, to NCCUSL 2 (May 25, 1994) (regarding
UCC Article 5 policy issues) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
11. The proponents of an expanded definition of good faith for UCC Article 5 are
focused primarily on making consequential or punitive damage remedies available in cases
of bad faith dishonor by an issuer. See Thrner Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1-3.
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dence principle, and the availability of specific enforcement and
summary judgment remedies.
II. BAD FAr'H DEMAND FOR PAYMENT BY A BENEFICIARY
Letter of credit beneficiaries prepare and procure the documents
that are required to perform their contractual obligations to the appli-
cant and to satisfy the conditions of the letter of credit securing the
applicant's payment obligations to the beneficiary. In order to comply
with the documentary requirements of the letter of credit, benefi-
ciaries frequently present documents containing false statements.
Sometimes the beneficiary duly, or at least substantially, performs the
underlying contract but presents a document that misdescribes the
quantity, quality, or timing of its own performance.of the underlying
contract. This may occur because the parties did not draft the letter of
credit to match the terms of the underlying contract or the terms of
the underlying contract are amended but not the letter of credit.
Sometimes the false statement is conclusory and the beneficiary has
some basis for believing it to be true or otherwise defensible in the
context of the beneficiary's contractual relationship with the appli-
cant. In most cases the beneficiary is apparently, if not actually, moti-
vated to present the document containing a false statement because
deleting or qualifying the false statement would make the document
facially noncomplying under the letter of credit. Suffice it to say that a
surprising number of presentations that are facially complying benefit
from back dating, unauthorized signing, misdescription of contractual
performance, and the like. Also, there is considerable variation in
their effects on issuers and applicants12 and in the extent to which the
beneficiary is aware of those effects.
Under current UCC section 5-114(2), "fraud" justifies dishonor
of an apparently complying demand for payment under a letter of
credit. The question of what kind of fraud is required has been fre-
quently litigated, particularly by way of applicant actions seeking to
enjoin presentation by the beneficiary and honor by the issuer. Most
of the concerns and criticisms with this aspect of letter of credit law
12. If correcting the false statement would make the document facially nonconforming
under the letter of credit, then the false statement is material to the beneficiary's obtaining
payment under the letter of credit even if it is immaterial to the beneficiary's right to
payment on the underlying contract. Materiality may also be determined by reference to
the effect of the false statement on the value of the document to any holder, for example,
the extent to which a negotiable bill of lading indorsed in blank overstates the quantity
shipped.
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and practice have been that too many unjustified fraud claims have
been asserted by applicants with the effect of unjustifiably delaying
payment and forcing the beneficiary to litigate in the applicant's home
court.
Consistent with the opinion of the ABA/USCIB Task Force,' 3 the
NCCUSL Drafting Committee decided to keep extraordinary de-
fenses against honor narrow, whether raised by way of applicant in-
junction action or issuer defense. Accordingly, Draft Revised UCC
section 5-109 keeps the words "fraud" and "forgery," found in current
UCC section 5-114(2), for purposes of defining the scope of extraordi-
nary defenses against honor of facially conforming documents. Ad-
ding "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing"
to the definition of good faith would in time enlarge the scope of ex-
traordinary defenses against honor either by adding to the definition
of fraud, or by adding another type of extraordinary defense-like
"illegality"-which courts sometimes recognize.' 4
Draft Revised UCC section 5-110(a)(1) provides that the same
fraud which would justify dishonor would also support a post-honor
warranty claim. The NCCUSL Drafting Committee decided not to
create a post-honor warranty action for presentations that were un-
truthful but not fraudulent. That decision was based on the proposi-
tion that U.S. law should not differ from non-U.S. law and that letter
of credit law should not recognize claims based on the presentation of
documents under a letter of credit that would not also be recognized
on the presentation of documents in any cash-against-documents
transaction.' 5 An expanded definition of good faith for Article 5 pur-
poses would undercut that decision.
13. ABA/USCIB TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 32, reprinted in 45 Bus. LAW.
at 1614-16.
14. See, e.g., Western Sec. Bank v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 4th 156, 25 Cal. Rptr.
2d 908 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (1994). In this case an
issuer was excused from honoring a drawing that was deemed "fraudulent" within the
meaning of current UCC § 5-114(2) because the letter of credit proceeds were to be ap-
plied in violation of California's antideficiency statutes. Id. at 179-80, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
921.
15. Warranty on the transfer of documents is thus left to the law applicable to the
particular document, UCC § 7-507, for example, whether transferred under a letter of
credit or for collection. This means that most disputes over documents will be mooted or
resolved in the context of deciding disputes over performance of the underlying contract.
In enforcing the underlying contract, an expanded definition of good faith, as set forth in
current UCC § 2-103(1)(b), may be applicable. This is as it should be because the letter of
credit is independent of the underlying contract and is expected to be performed or, if
necessary, enforced without regard to most contract law principles and equitable doctrines.
[Vol. 28:101
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There is another kind of possible bad faith presentation by a ben-
eficiary. In Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank,'6 the majority
opinion stated that the beneficiary's knowing presentation of noncom-
plying documents was, among other things, a breach of the UCC sec-
tion 1-203 obligation of good faith. 7 As a result of that breach, the
issuer was permitted to defend its dishonor on the basis of facial non-
compliance which the issuer had not specified .in a timely notice of
dishonor.'8 Draft Revised UCC section 5-108(c) provides for preclu-
sion, rather than estoppel, against issuers that do not give timely and
specific notice of dishonor. Here, too, expanding the definition of
good faith would undercut the strictness of the preclusion approach,
exposing beneficiaries to a type of defense or claim based on bad faith
that is not now recognized in practice or the courts-apart from the
Philadelphia Gear majority opinion.
III. BAD FAnTH HONOR BY AN ISSUER
Letter of credit issuers are frequently put on notice that the bene-
ficiary's demand for payment is fraudulent. The notice is frequently
supported by some indication of irregularity in the documents and by
some extrinsic evidence of fraud. Issuers typically ignore such "evi-
dence" of fraud, taking the position that the applicant must timely
persuade a court as to the merits of its fraud claim and obtain an in-
junction against presentation or honor. 9 In this regard, issuers typi-
cally will not delay honor by even a day or two, notwithstanding
applicant representations that further fraud evidence or a court in-
junction will be forthcoming shortly.
Current UCC sections 5-114(2)(b) and 5-114(3) provide that an
issuer "acting in good faith" may honor a fraudulent presentation by
16. 717 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983).
17. Id. at 238.
18. Id. at 238-40. The Philadelphia Gear letter of credit was subject to the UCP, which
precludes issuers from raising defenses that are not timely notified to the presenter. Pre-
clusion is different from contract law concepts of waiver and estoppel. Preclusion occurs
without regard to the issuer's intent to waive any defense or to the beneficiary's detrimen-
tal reliance on the issuer's action or inaction. See James G. Barnes, Nonconforming
Presentations Under Letters of Credit: Preclusion and Final Payment, 56 BROOK. L. REv.
103, 106-07 (1990).
19. Current UCC § 5-114(2)(b) and Draft Revised § 5-109(b) expressly authorize in-
junctions against honor. Were UCC Article 5 to make injunctive relief unavailable, then it
might be appropriate to reconsider the extent to which issuers may be required to evaluate
all evidence of fraud that is timely presented to the issuer. Under current practice, issuers
generally decline to exercise whatever discretion they may have to dishonor a demand that
is fraudulent.
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the beneficiary and still be entitled to reimbursement from the appli-
cant. As noted above, issuers routinely exercise the right to honor
and then claim reimbursement, and they have proved invulnerable to
applicant claims that they did not act in good faith.20 Indeed, appli-
cants are well advised not to waste time or money litigating this issue,
and in fact they do not litigate this issue much.
The NCCUSL Drafting Committee did not wish to change this
practice or the law on which it is based.21 Accordingly, Draft Revised
UCC section 5-109(a)(2), in combination with section 5-108(i)(1), en-
titles an issuer to reimbursement for honoring a fraudulent presenta-
tion if the issuer was "acting in good faith."
Also in this context, enlarging the definition of good faith would
change the -effect of current section 5-114, reversing the decision of
the NCCUSL Drafting Committee to retain the current law and prac-
tice. It would put an issuer's right of reimbursement at risk and
thereby induce issuers to dishonor in many more instances than is now
the case. This would have obvious consequences for the standing of
U.S. bank letters of credit in domestic and international commerce.
IV. BAD FAITH DISHONOR BY THE ISSUER
In everyday practice, issuers 'dishonor presentations that do not
"strictly" comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.
A substantial percentage of all presentations made under letters of
credit, -particularly commercial letters of credit, do not strictly com-
ply. Most, discrepancies are timely "cured by the beneficiary or
waived by the issuer-typically backed by a general or specific waiver
by the applicant.
Current UCC Article 5 does not provide whether compliance
should be "strict," "substantial," or "reasonable." Compliance issues
are frequently litigated, however, and the clear weight of judicial au-
20. There were two reported decisions on this issue in 1993 and none in 1992. See
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Metro Institutional Food Serv., 497 N.W.2d 225, 227-28 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993) (majority held issuer acted in good faith as matter of law, but dissent would
have remanded for trial as to issuer's good faith); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Terry, No. C4-
93-440,1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 1127, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1993) (jury found that
issuer acted in good faith).
21. The ABA/USCIB Task Force saw no problem with this aspect of the UCC and
therefore expressed no opinion about it.
22. See Barnes, supra note 18, at 108.
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thority supports a strict compliance standard. 3 Moreover, worldwide
practice is to require beneficiaries to meet a strict-compliance stan-
dard.24 On that basis, the ABA/USCIB Task Force recommended
that the revised UCC Article 5 expressly recognize practice and pro-
vide for a standard of strict compliance as practiced by banks. 5 The
NCCUSL Drafting Committee decided that revised UCC Article 5
should provide a norm of strict compliance determined by "standard
practice."'26
Requiring issuers to observe "reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing" when examining a presentation that does not strictly
comply in accordance with standard practice would create confusion,
weaken the role of practice, and unsettle case law in the much-liti-
gated area of facial compliance. Accordingly, expanding the defini-
tion of good faith would undercut, if not contradict; the substantive
decision that compliance should be strict rather than reasonable and
should be based on standard practice rather than fair dealing.
In due course beneficiary lawsuits for wrongful dishonor would
be accompanied by a separate count for bad-faith dishonor. This
would permit the beneficiary to discover and introduce evidence as to
whether application of the strict-compliance rule was unreasonable
and unfair in light of the beneficiary's ignorance of letter of credit
practice, the beneficiary's substantial performance of the underlying
contract, or the applicant's efforts to influence the issuer's decision to
dishonor.27 This kind of evidence, of course, would be immaterial and
irrelevant in an ordinary wrongful dishonor case, where the liability
issues are limited to whether the presentation strictly complied and
23. See, e.g., Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 982 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.
1992); ABA/USCIB TASK FoRcE REPoRT, supra note 1, 1 30, reprinted in 45 Bus. LAw. at
1608.
24. See Alaska Textile Co., 982 F.2d at 816 n.1 ("Over 140 countries use the [UCP].").
The UCP is regularly interpreted as requiring "strict compliance." See Board of Trade v.
Swiss Credit Bank, 728 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984).
25. See ABAIUSCIB TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 30, reprinted in 45 Bus.
LAW. at 1609.
26. See Draft Revised U.C.C. § 5-108(a).
27. Issuers are subject to attack from both the applicant and beneficiary for any issuer
action or inaction that affects the dispute between them, particularly in cases where the
applicant's claim of beneficiary fraud appears to have some merit but attracts a response
from the beneficiary, or the beneficiary's bank, to the effect that the applicant is acting in
bad faith in making such a claim. It is ironic that an expanded good faith obligation is
expected to deter misuse of the fraud defense but not expected itself to be misused. There
is a much greater potential for misusing "fair dealing" than "fraud."
November 19941
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whether the issuer preserved its defenses by timely notice of
dishonor.'
Discouraging dishonor of documents that strictly comply in ac-
cordance with standard letter of credit practice is a worthy goal. Draft
Revised UCC Article 5 pursues this goal by codifying the preclusion
rule29 excluding beneficiary warranties that the documents are truth-
ful,3° eliminating beneficiary duties to mitigate damages,31 mandating
payment to the successful claimant of interest from the date of dis-
honor, and authorizing payment to the prevailing party of attorneys
fees and expert witness expenses.32 Draft Revised UCC Article 5
should greatly facilitate specific performance of an issuer's undertak-
ing by way of summary judgment. Expanding the definition of "good
faith" would not facilitate summary judgment, and therefore can only
be justified on the grounds that it would induce issuers to pay volunta-
rily. So would adoption of a "reasonable compliance" standard, but
the protection of applicant expectations is an equally valid concern as
is the need to keep issuers out from the middle of applicant-benefici-
ary disputes.
3 3
There is an obvious appeal to having a single definition of good
faith applicable to all articles of the UCC, but the "uniform" in UCC
refers to enactment in all states of the same law, not the same law for
all of the mercantile specialties covered by the UCC. Changing letter
of credit law by expanding the definition of good faith puts adoption
of revised UCC Article 5 at serious risk, particularly in New York and
the three other states that provide that letters of credit subject to the
UCP are not governed by the UCC.
34
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay focused on particular letter of credit practices and the
negative effects on those practices of requiring "observance of reason-
able commercial standards of fair dealing," notably the effects of
28. Correspondingly, the issuer's defenses based on the discrepancies raised in its no-
tice of dishonor would be supplemented by a separate defense of bad faith presentation so
as to permit the issuer to discover and introduce evidence as to whether the beneficiary
knew the presentation was facially noncomplying or that the documents were untruthful.
29. See Draft Revised U.C.C. § 5-108(c); see also supra note 18 (containing discussion
of preclusion).
30. See discussion of warranty, supra note 15.
31. See Draft Revised U.C.C. § 5-111(a).
32. See id. § 5-111(d).
33. See Kerry L. Macintosh, Letters of Credit: Curbing Bad-Faith Dishonor, 25 UCC
L.J. 3 (1992).
34. See supra note 5.
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broadening the fraud defense35 and narrowing the strict-compliance
defense. 6 The tendency to generalize from contract law to letter of
credit law is not confined to the topic of good faith or to the realm of
law revision.
Contract law principles are among the first learned and most
often applied by U.S. lawyers. Moreover, the UCC has been success-
ful in codifying and developing contract law. UCC sections 1-205
(course of dealing), 2-609 (adequate assurances), 2-615 (force
majeure), and 9-318 (assignment of accounts) are but a few instances
of UCC concepts and language that have come to pass among practic-
ing lawyers as the modem law of contracts. It may be that UCC draft-
ers now view the articulation of general contract law principles in the
UCC as a goal in light of the extent to which UCC language has been
applied by analogy or simply borrowed for use in drafting ordinary
contracts. That would be understandable but unfortunate because the
UCC's primary goal should be to differentiate the laws applicable to
the various mercantile specialties, particularly given the tendency of
the marketplace to develop ever more differentiated financial and
commercial products.
35. See supra parts Il-II.
36. See supra part IV.
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